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EXHIBIT 9
CODALE ELECTRIC
HYPOTHETICAL LIQUIDATION SCHEDULE
AS OF JANUARY 31,1994
(in $000's)

ASSETS

Book
Value

Liquidation
Value

CASH(1)

326.4

326.4

ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE (2)

4,711.6

4,476.0

INVENTORIES (3)

2,270.0

2,366.9

OTHER CURRENT ASSETS (4)

325.8

325.8

PROPERTY & EQUIPMENT (5)

906.6

906.6

OTHER ASSETS (6)

238.1

238.1

INTANGIBLE ASSETS (7)

347.2

0.0

TOTAL ASSETS

9,125.7

TOTAL ESTIMATED REALIZABLE
VALUE OF ASSETS

8,639.8

LIABILITIES AND EQUITY
5,230.3

5,230.3

602.0

602.0

STOCKHOLDERS' EQUITY

3,293.4

0.0

TOTAL LIABILITIES &
STOCKHOLDERS' EQUITY

9,125.7

CURRENT LIABILITIES (8)
LONG-TERM LIABILITIES (8)

TOTAL ESTIMATED REALIZABLE
VALUE OF LIABILITIES

5,832.3

ESTIMATED LIQUIDATION VALUE

2,807.5

Notes: See following page
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
DALE P. HOLT,

v.

) RESPONSE TO APPELLEE'S
) MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS
) OF APPELLANT'S BRIEF
)
) Case No. 950169-CA
)

VICKIE L. HOLT,

)

Plaintiff, Appellee,
and Cross-Appellant,

Defendant, Appellant,
and Cross-Appellee.

)
)
I

INTRODUCTION
1.

Response to URCP 23 Motion to Strike. The Appellant,

Vickie L. Holt

("WIFE"), responds to Appellee Dale P. Holt's

(HUSBAND") URAP 23 Motion to Strike Portion of Appellant's Brief as
follows:

Wife's Response to Motion to Strike -1

Am>endix "0"

II

RESPONSE TO "FACTUAL BACKGROUND"
2. Husband failed to mention hearing of Wife' s URCP 59 Motion
or the resulting order.

Husband's "Factual Background for this

Motion" is incomplete, in that he has omitted other important
proceedings by the trial court. Husband's failure to consider the
2/14/95 hearing or the resulting Order1 probably explains why he
filed a a non-meritorious motion to strike, and why he erroneously
asserted therein that the matters sought to be struck from Wife's
brief had not been considered by the trial court,2 when they had
been argued and ruled upon.
3.

Husband's omissions. Husband's omissions in his "Factual

Background" summary include the following:
(a)

Failure to include 2/4/95 Order and Judgment. Husband's

summary failed to mention the Court's 2/4/95 (ten page) "Order and
Judgment" wherein the Court made extensive findings and orders
concerning custody, visitation, alimony, child support, insurance,
distribution of assets, etc. * However, that omission does not
substantially affect his Motion to Strike.

1

See discussion in f 3(b) below.

2

Husband incorrectly alleges that "A significant portion of Mrs. Hot's Brief contains references to
evidence submitted post-trial and not considered by the Court when making its ruling." [See page 1 of Husband's
Motion to Strike Portion of Appellant's Brief'].
Wife's Response to Motion to Strike - 2

(b)

Failure to include 2/14/95 hearing and 3-21-95 "Order in

re: Defendant's Motion to Correct Judgment, for a New Trial, etc."
Husband's summary of proceedings failed to mention the 2/14/95
hearing and oral argument3 re Wife's URCP

59 Motion or the

resulting 3/21/95 "Order in re: Defendant's Motion to Correct
Judgment, for a New Trial, etc., which denied Wife's URCP 59
Motion.4

Husband's failure to include that Order is curious, since

in 1 14 Husband's memorandum he refers to the Court's 3/21/95
"Order on Post Trial Motions",5 says that a copy is attached as Ex.
X>

C", but instead his Ex. X>C" contains a copy of the omitted Court

3/21/95 Order denying Wife's URCP 59 Motion.
Ill

ARGUMENT
T r i a l Court Considered Data Sought t o be Struck
4.

Husband's

Husband argues t h a t

3

4
5

argument m i s s t a t e s

the

facts.

Counsel

s i n c e W i f e ' s URCP 59 Motion and

for

supporting

R. 532 & 540.
R. 540-541 and Ex. " C to Husband's Motion to Strike.
R. 534-539.
Wife's Response to Motion to Strike - 3

affidavits were filed after the 11/5/94 hearing,6 that for some
unexplained reason they must be:
"evidence . . . which was not considered by
the trial court in its rulings, which under
Utah law should not be considered on appeal."7
(emphasis added)
and that they are allegedly are
"outside the scope of evidence."8
added)

(Emphasis

Counsel for Husband is in error. The arguments in Wife's URCP 59
Motion, supporting affidavits, etc. were "considered by the Court"

6

Wife's URCP 59 Motion [R. 400-502, 505-513 & 528-531] sought relief and was based upon various
grounds as follows:
1. URCP 59(a)(3) [accident or surprise]; URCP 59(a)(4) [newly discovered evidence]; URCP 59(a)(5) [newly
discovered evidence]; URCP 59)a)(6) [insufficiency of evidence]; and URCP 59(a)(7) [error in law].
2. URCP 59(e) [Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment and Orders].
3. Incorporated by reference Wife's 11/3/94 "Defendant's Memorandum re Motion to Correct Ruling and to
Distribute Additional Assets or for a New trial," a copy of which was attached thereto as Ex. #1.
4. Argued that at 11/4/94 hearing the Court declined to hear arguments raised by Wife's 11/3/94 Memorandum
and invited Wife to bring those matters before the Court after entry of Findings, Conclusions and Order. Wife
moved the Court for an order vacating the 11/4/94 "Order on Post Trial Motions" to the extent that it purported to
deny Wife's 11/3/94 Motions.
5. Attached the affidavits of Paul Shields and Robert Hunter and referred to trial testimony and exhibits.
6. Stated that the motion pertained to Findings, Conclusion, Order and Judgement, Order on Post Trial Motions;
and generally to orders and decisions pertaining to distribution of assets, payment of taxes, award of alimony, child
support, payment of expert witness fees, attorney fees, costs, life insurance, mandatory withholding and other
orders pertaining to financial matters.
7

Page 1 of Husband's Memorandum.

8

See second introductory ^ in Exhibit "A", page 6 to Husband's Motion to Strike."
Wife's Response to Motion to Strike - 4

in Making its 3/21/95 Order, and are not "outside the scope of
evidence" as alleged.
5.

Husband's argument ignores 2/14/95 hearing and 3/21/95

Order. Husband's argument ignores the 2/14/95 hearing and the
Court's resulting 3/21/95 order,9 improperly asks the Court to
strike reference to and to disregard the proceedings which occurred
after the November 5, 1994 hearing,10 and improperly seeks to limit
the record on appeal to the trial and the 11/5/94 hearing. Contrary
to Husband's argument, the trial court did hear oral argument of
Wife's URCP 59 Motion and entered an order denying that motion.11
6.

Wife appealed from denial of her URCP 59 Motion.

Wife's

appeal specifically includes an appeal from the Court's post-trial
orders.12

As indicated above, counsel for Husband incorrectly

states that the potions of Wife's brief which he is asking the
Court to strike were allegedly not considered by the trial Court.13
He is wrong. Wife is entitled to appeal from the Court's denial of

9

Copy attached as Ex. "C" to Husband's Motion to Strike.

10

See second 1f of Exhibit "A" to Husband's Motion to Strike, wherein he states:
All reference to the "Record ("R") after record page 400 are outside the scope
of evidence heard at trial or in the November 5,1994 Hearing."

11

The Court's 3/21/95 Order recites that Wife's URCP 59 Motion and errata thereto were argued to the
Court by counsel for the parties, and the Court's ruling thereon was reduced to writing in that Order, which is
entitled "Order in re: Defendant's Motion to Correct Judgment, for a Ne Trial, etc,"
12

See content of the Amended Notice of Appeal, R. 548-549.

13

See footnote #2 above.
Wife's Response to Motion to Strike - 5

her URCP 59 Motion.

Citations to the record in support of that

portion of the appeal are proper and appropriate and should not be
struck.
7.

Cases re striking briefs. As discussed below, the cases

cited by counsel for Husband do not support his Motion to Strike.
Maughn

(a)

v. Maughn.

In Maughn

v.

Maughn,1A

cited by

Husband, the Court of Appeals properly struck documents not in the
record and which were presented for the first time with a reply
Unlike Maughn, in the present case Wife's URCP 59 Motion,

brief.

affidavits, etc. were presented to and ruled upon by the trial
court.
Territorial

(b)
Territorial

Savings & Loan Association

Savings & Loan Association

v. Baird.

In

v. Baird,15 a party sought

to supplement the record on appeal with a deposition that had not
been submitted to the trial court in connection with a Motion for
Summary

Judgment.

The Court of Appeals properly held that

"evidence not available to the trial judge cannot be added to the
record on Appeal" (citation omitted).
present case the evidence sought

As indicated above, in the

to be struck was not only

available to the trial court, but the trial court heard oral

14

Maughn v. Maughn (Utah Ct.App. 1989) 770 P.2d 156.

15

Territorial Savings & Loan Association v. Baird (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 781 P.2d 452.
Wife's Response to Motion to Strike - 6

argument thereon and signed a written order denying that motion.
Baird,

supra,

supports Wife's argument that since that evidence was

"available to the trial judge" it can properly be considered on
appeal•
(c)

In Chapman v. Chapman16 the Supreme

Chapman v. Chapman.

Court properly refused to consider answers to interrogatories and
requests for admissions attached as an addendum to appellant's
brief, but which were "outside the record."
support

Husband's

argument

Chapman does not

since Wife's URCP

59 Motion and

supporting affidavits, etc. were not "outside the record" but are
an integral part of the record.
(d)

Painting

Covert Copier Painting

v. Van Leeuwen.

In Covert Copier

v. Van Leeuwen (Utah Ct.App. 1990) 801 P.2d 163, 170, the

Utah Court of Appeals properly refused to consider an interrogatory
answer and an affidavit filed in connection with an earlier motion,
where:
"Neither
this
affidavit
nor
the
interrogatories were included in the materials
supplied to the judge when he decided Van
Leeuwen's Motion
for Summary Judgment.
(Emphasis added).

16

Chapman v. Chapman, (Utah 1986), 728 P.2d 121, 123.
Wife's Response to Motion to Strike - 7

Unlike Covert,

supra,

as discussed above, in the present case the

affidavits and other documents sought to be struck were "included
in the materials supplied to the judge."
(e) Jackson v. Remington
Park,

Inc.

Park,

Inc.

In

Jackson

v.

Remington

(Okl. App. 1994) 874 P.2d 814, the Court properly held

that an affidavit filed the day after the Court's ruling was not
evidence before the court at the time of the ruling on the summary
judgment motion and was not properly part of the record on appeal.
As discussed above, in our case Wife's URCP 59 Motion, supporting
affidavits, etc. were before the Court, were ruled upon and are
properly part of the record on appeal from the trial court's denial
of Wife's URCP 59 Motion.
Systems

W. Const.

Similarly, in Moon Lake Elec.

v.

Ultra

(Utah Ct.App. 1988) 767 P.2d 125 at 128 the Court

of Appeals properly rejected an argument that a summary judgment
should be reversed based upon untimely affidavits and unpublished
depositions.
8.
Husband

Citations to legal authorities in Wife's Appendix which
seeks to have struck.

Without

supporting argument,

Husband's Motion to Strike17 improperly seeks to strike Wife's URAP
24(11) (A) legal authorities. URAP 24(11) (A) provides for inclusion
in an appendix copies of statutes, rules, regulations, etc. of

See Exhibit "A" to Motion to Strike, page 6.
Wife's Response to Motion to Strike - 8

central importance which are not reproduced verbatim in the brief.
In compliance with that rule, Wife included copies of such items in
her

addendum,

which

Husband

now

seeks

to

strike

for

some

unexplained reason. Authorities and materials included in Wife's
Appendix are summarized in the footnote.18

Those materials have

been included pursuant to URAP 24(11) (A) and for the convenience of
the Court and should not be struck.
9. Shield's affidavit. Paul Shield's19 affidavit20 analyzes the
financial consequences of the Court's division of assets, etc.
Among other things, he furnished computations, charts and graphs to
demonstrate that Husband received substantially more than ^ of the
18

URAP materials included in Wife's Appendix, which Husband seeks to strike, include the following:

Appendix C - Copy of 26 USCS § 1041 - Federal tax statute re taxability of transfers of property between spouses
or
incident to divorce.
Appendix D - Copy of:
(a) Commerce Clearing House Income Taxes ^ 32,70, pages 55,278 through 55,285; and
(b) IRS Temporary Regulations concerning 26 USCS § 1041.
Appendix E - Copy of USCS § 301 re tax consequencefromdistribution of property.
Appendix F - Copy of IRS rules re distributions of money and property.
Appendix G - Copy of National Office Technical Advise Memorandum re taxability of distribute ins in redemption
of
stock and of transfers between spouses or incident to divorce.
Appendix H - Copy of ArticlefromJournal of Corporate Taxation which discusses the Ninth Circuit Antes case
and
subsequent Tax Court cases re taxability of redemptions of stock incident to a divorce.
19

Mr. Paul Shields is a Certified Public Accountant employed by Neilson Elggren Durkin & Co.

20

Appendix B - Copy of Paul Shields 2/1/95 Affidavit and attachments thereto. R. 476-493.
Wife's Response to Motion to Strike - 9

marital assets, even based upon the Court's having charged Husband
only salvage value for the marital business, to demonstrate the
inequality

in

the

Court's

division

of

inequality of resulting earnings, etc.

martial

assets,

the

Until the Court made a

decision no such affidavit, computations, projections, etc. could
be made. Shield's affidavit and supporting materials were properly
filed in support of Wife's URCP 59 Motion, and should not be
struck.

They could not have been filed in connection with the

11/5/94 hearing since the Court had not yet made a decision to
which he could address his affidavit.

Mr. Shield's affidavit and

supporting materials were before the Court when it made its 3/21/95
order denying Wife's URCP 59 Motion.21
10.

Hunter's

affidavit. Robert

D. Hunter's affidavit22

analyzes the income tax consequences of the Court's order re asset
distribution, and presented a proposal which, if it had been
adopted by the Court, would have decreased the tax consequences
from about $440,000 using the Court's method of dividing marital
assets,

to

about

$30,000

if his proposed

alternative

asset

distribution method were used. Among other things, Mr. Hunter
furnished computations, charts and graphs to demonstrate the tax
consequences under different scenarios.

Until the Court made a

21

Appendix B - Copy of Paul Shields 2/1/95 Affidavit and attachments thereto. R. 476-493.

22

Appendix I - Copy of Robert Hunter's 2/6/95 Affidavit and attachments thereto R. 495-502.
Wife's Response to Motion to Strike -10

decision no such affidavit, computations, projections, etc. could
be made. Hunter's affidavit and supporting materials were properly
filed in support of Wife's URCP 59 Motion, and should not be
struck.

They could not have been filed in connection with the

11/5/94 hearing since the Court had not yet made a decision to
which he could address his affidavit. Mr. Shield's affidavit and
supporting materials were before the Court when it made its 3/21/95
order denying Wife's URCP 59 Motion.23
11.
The

first

Appendix O is a summary of plaintiff's trial exhibit.
five lines of Appendix 0 is a summary of income

projections for the family business made by Husband's expert, and
the next five lines are an additional five year projection made
therefrom.24 It is difficult to understand Husband's argument as to
why a summary of his own trial exhibit should be struck.
12. Arguments and footnotes. Without description, argument or
explanation, Husband asks the Court to Strike about nineteen
references and arguments in Wife's brief.25

Husband's Motion to

Strike is too vague and indefinite to permit a meaningful response.
23

R. 495-502.

24

The first five lines on Appendix O are summarizedfromHusband's Expert's Exhibit #3 to Husband's
trial exhibit #21, which project incomefromthe family business forward forfiveyears through 1999. Based
thereon Wife's expert, Shields, carried that projection forward anotherfiveyears, through 2004, as shown on lines
6 through 10.
25

See Exhibit "A", page 6 to Husband's Motion to Strike, where Husband supplies a laundry list of
paragraphs in Wife's brief, with related footnotes, without further explanation.
Wife's Response to Motion to Strike -11

To the extent, if at all, that Husband seeks to strike arguments or
footnotes based upon his incorrect argument that Wife's URCP 59
Motion and the supporting affidavits by Shields and Hunter were
allegedly not available to or were allegedly not considered by the
Court in making its ruling, Husband's motion to strike arguments
and footnotes should be denied because, as discussed above, that
motion and those affidavit were not only available but were argued
and ruled upon by the Court.
IV

CONCLUSION
Husband's Motion to Strike is without merit.

It should be

summarily denied and Wife should be awarded her attorney fees
incurred in connection with that motion.
Dated June 15, 1996.
Ronald C. Barker, attorney for Appellant Vickie Holt
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a copy of the foregoing to be
mailed the 15th day of June, 1996, to the following persons at the
addresses indicated:
E. Paul Wood, Esq.
Ann L. Wasserman, Esq.
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102.

Ronald C. Barker
Wife's Response to Motion to Strike -12
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Attorneys for Dale P. Holt,
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Appellee and'Cross Appellant
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 531-0435
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
DALE P. HOLT,
Plaintiff, Appellee
and Cross Appellant,

REPLY TO APPELLANT
VICKIE L. HOLT'S
RESPONSE TO MOTION TO STRIKE
PORTIONS OF APPELLANT'S BRTEF

v.
VICKIE L. HOLT,
Defendant, Appellant
and Cross Appellee
.

Case No. 950169-CA
Judge
ooOoo

Appellant, Vickie L. Holt's Response to Appellee Dale P.
Holt's Motion to Strike Portions of Vickie Holt's Appeal Brief
entirely misinterprets the primary thrust of the Motion to Strike
and admits that the evidence which Dale Holt seeks to strike from
the Appeal Brief was not admitted into evidence before the trial
court

when

the

trial

court

entered

its

Findings

of

Fact,

Conclusions of Law and Judgment on January 4, 1995."
1.

Dale Holt moves this Court to strike portions of

Vickie Holt's Appeal Brief. The basis of the Motion is that Vickie
Holt bases segments of her arguments contained in her Appeal Brief

Appendix "R"

that the Court's Findings of Factf Conclusions of Law and Judgment
entered January 4, 1995 should be set aside and are erroneous, on
evidence iti !the form of Affidavits, Articles and Summaries filed
with Vickie Holt's Rule 59 Motion on February 2, 1995. Mr. Holt's
point in making this Motion is very simple:

the trial court did

not have the evidence before it on January 4, 1995 when it ruled on
the merits of the trial held June 13-15, 1994.

Since the evidence

was not before the trial court when it made its decision, the
evidence cannot be used as a basis for finding that the Court's
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law or Judgment are in error.
2.

Vickie

Holt

admits that the Affidavits

of

Paul

Shields and Robert Hunter and the various summaries and exhibits of
which Mr. Holt complains were submitted with the Rule 59 Motion
subsequent to the Court's January 4, 1995 ruling.

(Vickie Holt

Response, section 5, 9, 10 and 11).
3.

In her Response, Vickie Holt erroneously attempts to

bootstrap use of the subsequently filed evidence as a basis for
appealing the Court's January 4, 1995 Findings, Conclusion and
Judgment.

Mrs. Holt asserts that since she has appealed the trial

court's denial of her Rule 59 Motion,, the evidence submitted in
connection with the Rule 59 Motion was "before the court" and "not
outside of the

scope

of evidence",

section 4 ) .
2

(Vickie Holt's Response,

First, while Mrs. Holt may have appealed from the trial
court's denial of her Rule 59 Motion in the sense that she makes a
statement to that effect in her Amended Notice of Appeal, Mrs.
Holt's Appeal Brief is totally barren of any reference to appealing
from the Rule 59 Motion.

At page 1, section I, "Jurisdiction",

Mrs. Holt states:
This is appeal from a final alimony, child
support and marital assets distribution order
as part of a divorce entered by the Second
Judicial District Court. (Appeal Brief, p. 1)
At page 2, subsection 11(b) of Mrs. Holt's Appeal Brief,
she recites the issues which she is appealing, none of which
includes denial of her Rule 59 Motion;
The issues presented for review
appeal are as follows:

in wife's

Distribution of Marital Estate
Alimony and Child Support
Witness Fees
Wife's Attorney Fees
Insufficient Findings
Finally at page 8, subsection 7 of Mrs. Holt's Appeal
Brief,

she

recites

in

subparts

(a) through

(n) the

"matters

challenged by Appeal", none of which address denial of the Rule 59
Motion.

There is simply no argument, case citation or standard

submitted by Mrs. Holt on the issue of appealing denial of the Rule
59 Motion.
3

Second,

even

in the

event

Mrs. Holt's Appeal

Brief

appropriately argued denial of her Rule 59 Motion, the evidence
submitted iri connection with the Rule 59 Motion could only be
considered by the Court of Appeals in connection therewith and not
as a basis for setting aside the court's Findings of Facyt or
holding that the trial court committed error in the Conclusions of
Law of Judgment.
CONCLUSION
The citations to portions of Mrs. Holt's Brief contained
in Exhibit "A" to the Dale Holt's Motion to Strike all contain
evidence which was submitted with Mrs. Holt's Rule 59 Motion which
should be stricken from Mrs. Holt's Appeal Brief.
DATED this ^ ^ d a y

of June, 1996.

LI^ELEFIELD & PETERSON

vyfc'E.
Paul Wood; Esq.
By: Ann L. Wassermann, Esq.
Attorneys for Dale P. Holt
Appellee and Cross Appellant

4

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, a true copy
of the foregoing, REPLY TO APPELLANT VICKIE L. HOLT'S RESPONSE TO
MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF APPELLANT'S BRIEF, this ^ / ^ d a y of
June, 1996, to:

RONALD C. BARKER
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84115-3692
DAVID PAUL WHITE
5278 Pinemont Drive, #A-200
Murray, Utah 84123

w6\holt.mem
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FILED
Utah Court of Appeals

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APP8ALS

JUL 0 2 1996

ocOoo

Marilyn M. Branch
Clerk of the Court

Dale P. Holt,
Plaintiff, Appellee, and
Cross-appellant,

ORDER
: a s e No, 950163-CA

vickie L. Holt,
Defendant, Appellant, and
Croas-appellee.

This matter is before zhe court upon appellee's motion,
filed Kay 24, 1996, to strike a portion of appellants brisf. On
June 17, 1996, appellant filed a response to appellee's motion to
strike, and on June 20, 1996, appellee filed a repLy to
appellant's response,
IT
denied.
Utah R.
date of

IS HEREBY ORDERED that appellee's xr.oticn to strike is
Appellant's second brief, as described in Rule 24(g),
App. P., shall be filed no later than 33 days from the
this order«

/
Dated t h i s ^ xiay

of J u l y , 1996,

FOR THE COURT

^fO^^^y

Mofnan H

Jack

Judge

TabT

304

Idaho

701 PACIFIC HEPORTER, 2d SERIES

PER CURIAM.
In August 1983, Rod Peterson, a motor
home dealer, loaned a pickup truck to Ivan
Perry Decker. Decker failed to return it.
He was subsequently charged with grand
theft, I.C. §§ 18-2403(1), 18-2407(1). After
a jury trial, he was convicted. He now
appeals, challenging only the sufficiency of
the evidence to sustain the conviction.
Specifically, he contends the evidence was
insufficient to prove that he "intended to
permanently deprive the victim of the use
(or] benefit of the vehicle."4 We affirm.
[1] Appellate review of the sufficiency
of the evidence is limited in scope. A judgment of conviction, entered upon a jury
verdict, will not be set aside where there is
substantial evidence updn which any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979);
State v. FiUon, 101 Idaho 381, 386, 613
P.2d 938, 943 (1980). "[W]e are precluded
from substituting our judgment lor that of
the jury as to the credibility of witnesses,
the weight of the testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the
evidence." State v. Campbell, 104 Idaho
705, 718-19, 662 P.2d 1149, 1162-63 <Ct.
App.1983). Furthermore, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
respondent. State v. Fenley, 103 Idaho
199, 203, 646 P.2d 441, 445 (Ct.App.1982).

>
(D

a
H.

The judgment of conviction is, therefore,
affirmed.
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Elizabeth Mary CARR,
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Court of Appeals of Idaho.
May 31, 1985.

In divorce proceeding, magistrate or
dered sale of community-owned business
and ordered proceeds divided between par
ties, and husband appealed. The District
Court, First Judicial District, Kootena
County, Watt E. Prather, J., affirmed, and
husband appealed. The Court of Appeals
Walters, C.J., held "that: (1) trial court
could order husband to agree to noncom
[2] We have reviewed the evidence un- petition clause in sales agreement, thereby
der these standards. The state's evidence including goodwill in sale of business; <2]
shows that Decker wanted to purchase a truck stop, including its goodwill, was com
motor home from Peterson but that a prob- munity asset which should have been val
lem arose concerning credit approval from ued and distributed by magistrate; and (3)
the bank. The problem -could not be re- trial court was required to determine value
solved until the next day. -Because Decker received for ngoodwill of business and tc
-was on foot, Peterson loaned him a pickup determine whether unequal division oi
truck to be used overnight. Rather than amount received for goodwill was approprireturning the vehicle the next day, Decker ate.
.drove it to Durango, Colorado, where he
Vacated and remanded.
-was eventually arrested. The jury reasonably could infer that Decker.intended to
Swanstrom, J., dissented in part and
deprive Peterson of the pickup.
filed opinion.
1. Decker's argument, in so far as it presumes
that theft requires intent to deprive the owner of
his property "permanently," fails to take ac-

count of the modern language of I.C. § 18-2403
Decker was prosecuted under the modern stat
ute.
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1. Divorce <s»286(l)
Issue of whether trial court could order husband to agree to noncompetition
clause in sales agreement when family
business was sold to facilitate property distribution in divorce proceeding did not become moot when husband signed noncompete provision, as husband agreed to sign
such provision only to avoid further contempt orders.
2. Divorce *®=>252.3(2)
Unless there are compelling reasons to
divide community assets unequally, division
of community property in divorce proceeding should be substantially equal. I.C.
§ 32-712.
3. Divorce <3=>252.3(2)
Method by which community property
is distributed in divorce proceeding is left
to discretion of trial court, hut ordinarily
trial court should divide community property in such way as to give each spouse the
sole and immediate control of his or her
share of property. I.C. § 32-712.
4. Divorce «=>252.3(5)
To give each spouse the immediate
control of his or her share of community
property distributed in divorce proceeding,
trial court may provide for sale of community property so long as sale order does not
amount to waste of community asset or
provide that property be sold for less than
it is worth.
5. Divorce <&=>269(2)
Trial court in divorce proceeding may
enforce its orders regarding property, distribution with contempt proceedings.
6. Divorce <&a>269(9)
^Trial court is not precluded from issu-.
ing orders to effectuate property disposition -decree where order, which might be
enforced with contempt proceedings, does
not direct payment of debt. Const. Art 1,
§ 15.
7. Divorce 4»252.3(5)
In ordering .sale of community business .to effectuate property disposition in

divorce action, trial court may require business' goodwill to be included in the sale.
8. Good Will <3=»4
Goodwill is property that can be sold
9. Husband and Wife «=>249<2)
Goodwill of business owned by spouse
may be community property, separate property or part community property and part
separate property, depending on circumstances. I.C. § 32-903.
10. Divorce <3=»252.3(1)
Husband and Wife <&=>248V2, 249(1),
250, 251
"Separate property" is all property
owned by either spouse before marriage,
and property acquired afterward by gift,
bequest, devise, or descent; "community
property" is all other property acquired
after marriage by either spouse. I.C.
§§ 32-903, 32-906.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
-definitions.
11. Husband and Wife <S=>249(2)
To extent it is acquired through efforts
of'Spouse during marriage, goodwill of
community-owned business is community
property. I.C. § 32-906.
12. HuBband and Wife *=>249(2)
Where spouses did not have interest in
truck stop until after they were married
and all their labor on behalf of business
occurred during coverture, -any goodwill
value of business was community property
which should have been valued and distributed upon divorce. I.C. §§ 32-503, 32-906.
13. Divorce «=»252.3(5)
In ordering sale of community business truck stop to effectuate property disposition in divorce action, magistrate did
•not err by ordering husband to execute
-reasonable noncompetition
agreement,
thereby including the goodwill in sale of
truck stop.
J 4 . Good Will $=»4

Goodwill of businesses sold when seller Agrees to noncompetition provision in
sales agreement.
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15. Divorce ^=252.3(5)
When family owned business is sold to
facilitate property division in divorce, trial
court must consider unique character of
goodwill along with statutory factors to
determine whether goodwill asset should
be divided equally; unique nature of goodwill, its sale by means of noncompetition
clause, its varying importance to separate
individuals of marital community, and effect of its sale on statutory factors may
constitute compelling reasons to divide value received for goodwill unequally. I.C.
§ 32-712.
16. Divorce <e=>252.3(5)
In ordering sale of community business to effectuate property disposition in
divorce action, trial court must determine
value received for goodwill of business and
must carefully consider statutory factors
to determine whether unequal division of
amount received for goodwill is appropriate, and court should also consider tax consequences to spouses resulting from differing treatment, for tax purposes, of goodwill and of covenants-not to compete. I.C.
§ 32-712.
17. Divorce e=>286(l)
Where court order requiring husband
to remove sign from adjacent property was
effective only while sale of communityowned business was pending, and sale had
since been completed, propriety of removal
order was moot.

ordered by the magistrate in the actaotf
the parties do not contest the division ol
distribution of any other assets. To <re1
solve the parties' interests in the family
business, the magistrate ordered a sale »f
the business and the proceeds divided between the parties. Orders by the magistrate, directing the husband to executes
sales agreement containing a covenant not
to compete and to remove a sign on property adjacent to the business, were appealed
by the husband to the district "court. The
district court affirmed. The husband ar>
peals from the district court decision. We
vacate the district court's decision in part
and remand for redetermination of the value and the distribution of the business
goodwill.
The issues presented on appeal may be
stated as follows: (1) when a family business is sold to facilitate property distribution in aT divorce, can a trial court order a
spouse to agree to a noncompete clause in
a sales agreement? (2) If so, can the trial
court's order be enforced with .a contempt
proceeding? (3) What consideration should
be given to the goodwill -of a business
ordered sold in a divorce action? • (4) Can a
trial court order a sign advertising a competing business to be removed from a former spouse's separate property until after
the family business is sold? (5) Should
either party to this appeal receive an award
of attorney fees?

The background of this case is as follows. - Elizabeth and Terry Carr were married in California in 1963. In 1975, the
Carrs moved to Post Falls, Idaho, and purchased a one-half interest in the Husky
Port TVuck Stop located near Post Falls.
CJ. Hamilton (argued), Hamilton &
They became sole owners of the truck stop
Hamilton, Steve F. Bell, Coeur d'Alene, for
in 1978. The business prospered under the
defendant-appellant.
Carrs' management; the physical plant was
Sue S. Flammia (argued), Flammia & Sol- expanded and modernized, a shop to sell
omon," Scott W. Reed, Coeur d'Alene, for and service CB radios was added, tire and
plaintiff-respondent.
fuel sales increased, restaurant sales flourished. Terry Carr was manager of the
WALTERS, Chief Judge.
entire operation except the restaurant,
This appeal involves the -disposition of which ^ras Jiandled by Elizabeth. -He
property following a divorce decree. "The worked twelve to fourteen hours a day at
issues concern the sale of a family business the business and was on call twenty-four
18. Constitutional Law ®»69
Court of Appeals would not issue advisory opinions.

4tours a day. In 1979, Elizabeth Carr filed
for divorce. Terry Carr counterclaimed
and the cause was tried before a magistrate.
Evidence was submitted concerning the
value of the assets and the amount of
outstanding liabilities of the truck stop.
From this evidence, the magistrate determined the business had a net worth of
$761,309. The magistrate assigned no value to "goodwill," concluding that "no credible evidence was presented at-trial to support a finding that the business possesses
any good will upon which a value can be
placed." Terry Carr was given sixty days
to purchase Elizabeth Carr's community interest in the truck stop, measured by onehalf its fair market value. For this purpose," the magistrate treated the net worth
of the business, $761,309, as its fair market
value. In the event Terry Carr did not
purchase his ex-wife's interest, the magistrate ordered the property to be sold and
the proceeds divided. Subsequently, Terry
Carr did not purchase his ex-wife's interest
in the truck stop, and efforts to sell the
business to a third party commenced.
[1] Prospective purchasers insisted on a
provision in the sales agreement limiting
Terry Carr's ability to open a competing
business. One typical noncompete -clause
prohibited the Carrs for five years from
opening a competing business within ten
miles of Husky Port Truck Stop. Because
Terry Carr owned property adjacent to the
truck stop, he was opposed to a noncompete clause in any sales agreement, which
would interfere with his planned use of the
adjacent property. The magistrate ordered
Terry Carr to execute a specific earnest
money agreement containing a covenant to not compete and, when he declined to do so,
the magistrate held Terry Carr in contempt
of court. To prevent further contempt orders, Terry Carr did subsequently sign an
earnest money agreement which contained
a noncompete provision.1 The magistrate
1. Elizabeth Carr contends the issues regarding
• the noncompetition clause became moot when
-Terry Carr executed the sales agreement. It is
clear Terry Carr agreed to the noncompete pro
vision only to avoid further contempt orders.

also ordered Terry Carr to remove a sign
announcing a new truck stop business to
open on the property adjacent to Husky
Port Truck Stop. On appeal, the magistrate's orders were affirmed by the district
court.
The district court, finding the noncompete covenant to be reasonable, upheld the
covenant and concluded that it was within
the magistrate's discretion to enter an order directing Terry Carr to agree to the
noncompete provision. The district court
declined to award additional compensation
to Terry Carr for his agreement to not
compete, by alteration of the magistrate's
distribution of property or-its proceeds.
The district court viewed the magistrate's
order to remove the sign as effective only
while the sale of Husky Port was pending.
The district court observed that, once the
sale was completed, Terry Carr was free to
replace the sign although replacement of
the sign could generate an action to enforce the covenant not to compete. The
magistrate's order regarding the sign was
therefore upheld. The district court also
upheld the magistrate's authority to enforce its orders by contempt proceedings.
{2] We turn first to the issues concerning the sale of the truck stop. Unless
there are compelling reasons to divide community assets unequally, the division of
community property in a divorce proceeding should be substantially equal. I.C.
§ 32-712. Here the magistrate found
there were compelling reasons to make an
unequal division of the community property
owned by the parties. We have not been
asked to review the propriety of that determination. In regard to the truck stop, the
magistrate ordered that Elizabeth Carr
should receive the first $4,846 from the
proceeds of the sale of the business and the
balance divided equally.
In those circumstances,-we hold the authority of
the magistrate to order execution of the limiting
clause and the subsequent finding of contempt
should riot bar appellate review of the issues
raised herein.
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[3-6] The method by which the proper- tablish value of goodwill). Subsequent^
ty is distributed is left to the discretion of •however, because of the demands by^&K
the trial court, Koontz v. Koonlz, 101 Ida- chasers for a covenant not to compete,<Jfe|
ho 51, 607 P,2d 1325 (1980), but ordinarily believe the existence of the goodi3|
the trial court should divide the community achieved a much greater significance;.!,
property in such a way as to give .each determining an appropriate division of f&m
spouse the sole and immediate control of -parties' property interests. In effect,-li^
his or her share of the property. Parker v. ordering Terry Carr to execute the noncorih
Parker, 95 Idaho 876, 522 P.2d 788 (1974). petition clause, the magistrate was requirb
Thus, to give each spouse the immediate ing that the goodwill x>f the truck stop
control of his or her share of the property, business be sold -along with the tangible
the trial court may provide for the sale of assets and the accounts receivable.
r
/
community property so long as the sale
In instances where a part}' sells his
order does not amount to waste of a combusiness, and, in connection with such
munity asset or provide that the property
sale, agrees that he will not engage In
be sold for less than it is worth. Id. The
the same or similar business in the same
trial -court in a divorce proceeding may
area for a particular and reasonable
enforce its -orders regarding property dis. length of time, it is obviously the inten;
tribution with contempt proceedings. See
tion on the seller's part to sell the good
Phillips v. -District - Court of the Fifth
will of the business, even though the
Judicial District, 55 Idaho'404, .609 P.2d
contract, as in,this instance, fails to ex1325 (1973).2
pressly mention good will. [Citations
[7] In this case,'6ie trial court ordered
omitted.]
Terry Carr to execute an earnest money
agreement containing a covenant to not Vancil v. Anderson, 71 Idaho 95,101, 227
compete for five years and within ten miles P.2d 74, 77 <1951). Given the trial court's
of Husky Port Terry Carr .subsequently authority in a tUvorce action to order <-the
was held in contempt of court for failing to sale of a community business to effectuate*
"sign the earnest money agreement.3 As property disposition, the issue is whether a
noted, when the .magistrate made findings trial court may require a business's goodof .the values of the various properties will to be Included in the sale. We hold
owned by .the parties, the magistrate was that it may.
not able, because of. a Jack of credible evi{8] Our Supreme Court long ago recogdence, to assign any value to the goodwill nized that the goodwill of a ousiness "is a
component of the truck stop. See Saviers species of property subject t o sale by the
v. Saviers, 92 Idaho 117, 438 P.2d 268 proprietor, and which may be sold by order
^1968); Loveland v. Xoveland, 91 Idaho of court
" Harshbarger v. Eby, 28 Ida400, 422 P.2d 67 (1967) (no error where trial ho 753, 761, 156 P. *19, 621 (1916),'quoting
court failed to divide value of goodwill of Smock v. Pierson, 68 Ind. 405734 Am.Rep.
community business in divorce actions 269 (1879). Goodwill is an intangible busiwhen The evidence was insufficient to es- ness asset not easily defined.
2. - Terry Carr cites "Phillips for a broad proposi- preclude a trial court from issuing orders to
tion that the trial pourt may not issue any posteffectuate a property disposition decree where
divorce orders unrelated to a former spouse's
the order, which might be -enforced -with conrfduty to support his wife or children. "The prop- ^tempt proceedings, does not direct payment of a
osition is erroneous. ;Phillips-he\d the iriaj
-debt.
court's order of .contempt did not violate art. 1,
§ 15 of the Idaho Constitution. That section
•prohibits imprisonment for debt. Phillips held 3. The earnest money agreement signed by Terry
jm order oCxxmtempt, and subsequent imprison- —Carnwhich eventually resulted in a sale of the
^business contained a covenant not to compete
ment, for failure to satisfy a property settlement
^for five -years within fiv5 miles of the Husky
5debt does not violate art. 1, § 15 if the debt was
Port Truck Stop.
-related to the former spouse's obligation to supjport -his wife or children. 'Phillips does not

The "good will" value of any business
enterprise is that value which results
from the probability that old customers
will continue to trade or deal with members of an established concern. It is the
probability that old customers will resort
to the old place or seek old friends, and
the likelihood of new customers being
attracted to well-advertised and favorably known services or goods.
Good will is the advantage or benefit
which is acquired by an establishment,
beyond the mere value of the capital,
stocks, funds or property employed
therein, in consequences of the general
patronage and encouragement which it
receives from constant or habitual customers on account of its location, or local
position or reputation for quality, skill,
integrity or punctuality. It is something
in business which gives reasonable expectancy of preference in the race of
competition.
Good will is property, so recognized
and protected by law. As such it is
subject to bargain and sale. [Footnotes
omitted.]
Jackson v. Caldwell, 18 Utah 2d 81, 415
P.2d 667, 670 (1966). However it is defined, goodwill clearly is property that can
be sold.
[9-13] Further, goodwill of a business
owned by a spouse may be community
property, separate property or part community property and part separate property,
depending on the circumstances. Separate
property is all property owned by either
spouse before marriage, and the property
acquired afterward by gift, bequest, devise,
or descent. I.C. § 32-903. Community
property is all other property acquired after marriage by either spouse. I.C. § 32906. Thus, to the extent it is acquired
through the efforts of a spouse ^during
4. There appears to be a split of authority as to
whether the goodwill of a professional practice
is a divisible or awardable asset in a divorce
action. See ANNOT., 52 A L.R3d 1344 (1973).
Because the case before us does not involve a
professional practice, we do not decide that
question today.

marriage, the goodwill of a community
owned business is community property. In
this case, the Carrs did not have an interest
in- the truck stop until after they were
married. All their labor on behalf of the
business occurred during coverture. Accordingly, any goodwill value of the business was community property which should
have been valued and distributed upon divorce.4 See Mueller v. Mueller, 144 CaL
App.2d 245, 301 P.2d 90 (1956); Hurley v.
Hurley, 94 N.M. 641, 615 P.2d 256 (1980);
Matter of Marriage ofFleege, 91 Wash.2d
324, 588 P.2d 1136 (1979). The magistrate
did not err by ordering Terry Carr to execute a reasonable noncompetition agreement, thereby including the goodwill in the
sale of the truck stop.5 See Lord v. Lord,
454 A.2d 830 (Me.1983) (trial court could
order the wife to execute a reasonable noncompetition clause to protect the goodwill
of a business awarded to the husband).
[14] The magistrate had initially concluded the value of Husky Port Truck Stop
contained no component of goodwill. The
business had not yet been sold and the
proceeds divided in accordance with the
magistrate's plan for distribution of the
community assets, when the noncompete
agreement became an issue in the divorce.
As Vancil v. Anderson, supra indicates,
the goodwill of a business is sold when the
seller agrees to a noncompetition provision
in the sales agreement It is clear the
purchasers here were interested in acquiring more than the real property, equipment, inventory, and accounts receivable of
Husky Port Truck Stop. The purchasers
also sought .to purchase the business's
goodwill, as is evident by then*-insistence
upon a noncompetition clause in the sales
-agreement On the record ^before lis, we
conclude that goodwill comprised a portion
of the value of the truck stop and that the
5. Terry Carr does not argue on appeal the distance and duration restrictions of the noncompetition clause are more than necessary to protect the truck stop's goodwill, making the clause
unreasonable and thus invalid. See Stipp v.
^Wallace Plating, Inc., 96 Idaho 5, 523 P.2d B22
(1974).
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community-owned^ business* including- its*
goodwill was a community asset1 which
should have been-valued and distributed by*
the magistrate? [15,16] It remains to be determined
whether?^the value, received for goodwill,
should be divided equally. As already noted, the 'division of community property
should be* substantially equal unless there
are competing reasons to divide It unequally, Terry Carr insists that he is entitled to
compensation for his agreement to not
compete with the Husky Port Truck Stop.
We agree that there may be compelling
reasons in this case to justify an unequal
division of the proceeds from the sale of
the truck stop. It is clear Terry Carr was
less willing than Elizabeth Carr to be restricted front opening another truck stop
business. Terry Carr owned property suitable for another-truck stop and he announced his intention to open a new busi*
ness at the earliest opportunity. His sale
of the-goodwill of Husky Port Truck. Stop
may have significantly affected his occupation* amount and source of income, use of
vocational skills, employability, and present
and potential earning* capability, all factors
to be considered in determining whether a
community property division should be
equal. Seel.C. § 32-712. When * familyowned business is sold to facilitate a property division in a divorce, we believe the
trial court must consider the unique character of goodwill along with the factors in
I.C. § 32-712 to determine whether the
goodwill asset should be divided equally.
The unique nature of goodwill, its sale by"
means of a noncompetition clause, its varying importance to the separate individuals
of the marital community, and the effect of
its sale on the section 32-712 factors may
constitute compelling reasons to divide the
value received for goodwill unequally. Because the magistrate did not consider the
goodwill of Husky Port Truck Stop after
the property was sold subject to the noncompete agreement, we vacate the property distribution decree regarding the truck
stop. On remand, the trial court must determine the value received for the goodwill
of the business, and must carefully consid-

2cr S E R I E S

er the-factors* listed in I.C.§ 32-712 to
determine whether an unequal division of
the amount received for the goodwill is
appropriate. The court should also consider the tax' consequences (if any) to the
Carrs, vis-a-vis each other and vis-a-vis the
buyer of the truck stop, resulting from
differing treatment, for tax purposes, of
goodwill and of covenants not to compete.
[17,18] We decline to determine Terry
Carr's contention that the magistrate erred
by ordering the removal of the sign from
property adjacent to the truck stop. Removal of the sign was ordered to avoid
discouraging prospective vendees from
making offers to purchase the truck stop.
Because the removal order was effective
only while the sale of Husky Port Truck
Stop was pending, and the sale has since
been completed, the propriety of the removal order is moot; although, as noted by the
district court, replacement of the sign may
be viewed as a breach of the noncompete
agreement Thus, our discussion of the
issue would resolve no actual controversy.
We decline to issue advisory opinions. See
Radermacher v. Eckert, 63 Idaha 531, 123
P.2d 426 (1942).
Both parties seek an award of attorney
fees on appeal. The award of attorney
fees in a divorce action is controlled by I.C.
§ 32-704. Because of the remand to determine the disposition of the goodwill component of the Husky Port Truck Stop we are
faced with an incomplete record upon
which we can consider the factors required
under I.C. § 32-704 in order to award attorney fees. Therefore, we instruct the
trial court on remand to determine whether
an award of attorney fees, for this appeal,
should be made to either party. See, e.g.,
Donndelinger v. Donndelinger, 107 Idaho
431, 690 P.2d 366 (Ct.App.1984).
The district court's order affirming the
magistrate's distribution of Husky Port
Truck Stop proceeds is vacated. The cause
is remanded to ascertain the proceeds attributable to the goodwill of the business
and to determine an appropriate division of
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those proceeds. Costs to appellant,, Terry
Carr.

much—if indeed he would purchase at all—
under such circumstances.

BURNETT, J., concurs.
SWANSTROM, J., dissenting in part
I would affirm the district court's order
in. total. The majority remands for the
trial court to redetermine the value of
^goodwill. However, there is no real equation which the trial court can apply to relate the value of goodwill to the amount, if
any, the husband should be paid for his
agreement not to compete. That is because, as the majority opinion correctly
shows, goodwill is comprised of many variable components. There is no definite relationship between goodwill and a* covenant
not to compete unless the parties to a
transaction agree both as to the value of
the goodwill and the value of the covenant
-This determination is not made without the
"participation of the buyer, as well as the
^sellers*. Here, the sale has been completed;
the purchase price fully paid
?-The husband contends in the trial court
that the goodwill of the business had no
.separate value. From evidence already
presented once, the magistrate was- unable
to assign any separate value to goodwill. I
see little to be gained by a remand on this
'point The fact remains that after the trial
court has made its new determination of
the value of the goodwill, whether it is $1
or $100,000, there will be no additional dollars available for distribution from the sale
o i the community business. This is not a
case where an asset was omitted from the
distribution or not considered^
f- Finally, the husband's contention that he
& entitled to a greater share of the sale
proceeds because of his agreement not to
'compete is not convincing in light of his
previous conduct First, he took the untenable position of trying to sell the business,.
J(ith the expectation of obtaining the best
Ifrice, while advertising to the world his
intention to open- a competing business on
adjoining property. Regardless of whether
the business to be sold haa any ascertainable goodwill value, a reasonable and prudent purchaser would not agree to pay as

Had the husband here wanted to continue in the operation of this type of businessat the same location he could have done so.
The trial court allowed him" every reasonable opportunity to purchase the wife's interest in the business. This included atleast one opportunity to meet the bona fide
offer of a prospective purchaser. The hus^
band first said that he would and later hedeclined. Now, he wants to be compensated for not being able to compete in closeproximity to the business he left I am not
persuaded that there is any legal or equitable grounds for a remand.

Douglas S. CLARK and Pamela J. Clark, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
George ENNEKING,
Defendant-Respondent
No. 15149.
Court of Appeals of Idaho.
May 31, 1985.
Homeowners brought suit against contractor seeking recovery for damages- allegedly sustained when contractor disrupted homeowners' sewer service- The District Court, Second Judicial District, IdahoCounty, George R. Reinhardt II, J., affirmed magistrate division judgment in favor of contractor, and homeowners appealed. The Court of Appeals, Walters, CJ.,
held that substantial competent evidence
supported jury's verdict in favor of contractor.
Affirmed.
Burnett, J., concurred in the result

